Key Concepts...

... according to Steven Ericsson Zenith's - Explaining Experience in Nature

Concepts

anthropogenic knowledge: The embodied product of human practice.

apprehension: Apprehension is the act of acquiring a sign.

apprehension: Apprehension is the act of individuating sense; the taking away of the world from mere sensory transduction to sensory conception.

apprehension: The differentiation of marks through impressions in the organism.

consciousness: The variety of properties associated with sense and cognition.

constructive explanation: An explanation that is built from clearly identified premises, constructed according to well-defined rules of logical construction. As we shall see in the course of this work, we must rely upon the mechanics that are the basis of apprehension and logic to enable our logical construction of the world.

emergence theory: Emergence theory is the theory that novel properties arise in the world that are independent of their functional dependence.

experience: Experience is the basis of consciousness. It is that which is most familiar. It is the common property of all senses. It is the first thing and the last thing for each of us. Though strictly, according to the model we will present, the first and the last thing for each of us is a sense – the primitive we will propose, characterized by physiology.

first principles: The initial determinates.

forms of intelligence: The sensory characterization of the primitive we propose constructs forms of intelligence that modify our inevitable behavior according to genetic disposition. This intelligence includes intellectual, intuitive and emotional capacity.

inevitable or intentional behavior of organisms: Organisms act inevitably according to genetic disposition. That action is mitigated by the intelligence of the organism; largely represented by the convention they embody.

laws: Laws are a priori determinants. They characterize the covariance of the primitive aspects of the world. By this definition, examples include, the laws of thermodynamics and gravity. “Laws of life (or complexity),” is also a meaningful statement by this definition.

magic: We use the term 'magic' and 'magical' here to refer to claims that are supernatural; i.e., outside a logical construction of the world.

marks: Formally, a mark is simply the subject of a sign. We distinguish two types of mark: one type is the product of semeiosis and the other is not. A thing designed, like a text or a television, we call a mark of metaphysics. Though we will often refer to a mark of this type more briefly as a “metaphysical mark.” A product of natural coincidence, such as a sunrise, is also a mark but is clearly not the product of semeiosis. We will refer to a mark of this type as a “natural mark.”

materialism: Materialism is the view that our physical models are essentially complete. Hence any explanation of experience in nature based upon this premise is logically constrained to identity and emergence.

Meaning: The behavioral product of apprehension.

naturalistic: A naturalistic solution relies upon nature as the sole basis of phenomena. It states that there are no fundamental divisions in the world and that all things are of and from a single universe, that all things are a part of the one natural world. Such solutions reject the very notion of the “supernatural”.

nominalism: We take nominalism to be the rejection of universals.

ontological status: We award ontological status to all things and behaviors that possess a functional dependence on the primitive aspects of the world. Thus sense, intelligence, the mind, possess ontological status according to our model. What then does not possess ontological status? We will see later that “relations” (the products of sentience) allow us to perceive things that do not exist (such as irrational numbers and television).

ontologically distinct: Ontological distinction is the aspect of our theory that argues that all constructions are ontologically distinct; the product of uniform laws. In our model ontological distinction is necessary for the isolation of our conception of relations. By arguing that existent entities and behaviors are ontologically distinct we enable a coherent model of relations as principal elements of sentience alone. Thus, for example, the notion of “class” and “set” are products of apprehension only.

physicalism: Physicalism, contrary to materialism, argues that the laws and principles of physics must necessarily be expanded to encompass a natural explanation of experience in nature as we discover more about perception. It is a view that allows new discovery.

principles: Principles are posterior determinants. Principles arise in the composition of Laws. By this definition natural selection is a principle of the world and not a law. In our model principles include those determinants that deal with the mitigation of genetic disposition through the engineering and operation of sentience.

relations: In our model “relations” possess ontological status only in their physical instantiation according to our model. Our model of ontology is one of strict independence, things exist in and of themselves and possess no a priori relationship to anything else. They are detached and merely coincident; quantum phenomena not withstanding. Quantum entanglement, in this model, is viewed as suggestive of the nonlocality we propose; though it does not itself provide a sufficient explanation. Thus, relations do not exist in the world beyond their apprehension. However, they uniquely possess “epistemological status”, they are the sole source of epistemology. Hence relations allow us to apprehend what does not in fact exist in the world - such as irrational numbers and televisions.

semeiotics: The study of signs, the development of general theories of signs.

signs: In our semeiotic model a sign is simply an individuated experience.

variety of sense: In addition to the variety of senses familiar to us, other sensory modalities are known. The Platypus, for example, is known to sense electrical phenomenon (called electroception).

verifiable: A statement is verifiable if it can be confirmed by others, given due consideration. Verification relies upon empirical observation and common mechanisms of inference.

The Semeiotics of Facebook : The Semeiotics of Facebook

The Semeiotics of Facebook Reasoning about behavior associated with Facebook. §1 Facebook represents a new development in the history of human social interaction. It enables connected individuals to increase familiarity at a pace that was previously impossible without physical proximity. And it is the most effectivenote:1 Note §2 As measured by its growth and commercial success. representative of a new breed of Internet application in which familiarity is the new currency. §3 In this paper I propose a model for reasoning about behavior on Facebook. In general, I am interested in systematic reasoning about the behavior of organisms. Here, specifically, I am interested in reasoning about the nature of interaction with Facebook and the effects that the marks signifying that interaction have upon behavior. The Basis of Behavior Natural law §4 The behavior of organisms have a wide range. They include, for example, the responses of bacteria in glucose gradients, the propagation of nesting behavior in animals, and the interaction behaviors of our species associated with the development of social order and productivity. There is obviously no gross equivalence between the behavior of our species and the behavior of simpler organisms, but I will take the position here that all such behaviors are the product of natural laws. More specifically, for reasons that lie outside of the scope of this paper, I observe that these behaviors are the product of the same laws. §5 This is contrary to the position taken by many contemporary emergence theorists, who apparently believe that such behavior is the product of magic. That is, we are increasingly hearing claims that such behavior is not predictable or determined by natural laws.(ref.1) Reference Kauffman, Stuart. Reinventing The Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason, and Religion. Basic Books (2008) (ref.2) Reference Wolfram, Stephen. A New Kind Of Science. (2001) Persuasion The objective. §6 The goal of this paper is to inquire into the nature of behavior associated with Facebook and similar Internet applications. In particular, our goal is to ask in what way Facebook is persuasive. But what exactly is “persuasion?” §7 Fogg (Persuasive Technology(ref.3) Reference Fogg, B.J.. Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change what We Think and Do. Morgan Kaufmann (2003) ) defines persuasion as “an attempt to change behaviors and attitudes.” §8 I take Fogg's use of the term “attitudes” simply to refer to the potential of an individual to behave in a particular way. A change in attitude is therefore a change in the probability that an individual will behave one way rather than another. §9 We are concerned then with the behavior of our species and the probability that individuals will behave in one way rather than another. When we speak of “persuasion” we are simply referring to the effects that interactions within the social network have upon these probabilities. Therefore, the study of persuasion on Facebook requires the construction of some model of these interactions and to show how modifications to them change behavior. §10 In the rest of this paper I will simply identify the factors that go into building such a model using the foundational theories that I am developing elsewhere(ref.4) Reference Ericsson-Zenith, Steven. Explaining Experience in Nature: The Foundations of Logic and Apprehension. IN PREPARATION (2008) . The actual construction and rigorous systematic treatment of such a model requires a more extensive account and is outside the scope of this paper. My purpose here is only to illustrate, for the general reader, how such a model may be constructed. Reasoning About Persuasion on Facebook How to build models of persuasion. §11 There has been much research into reasoning with and about probabilities and inductive logic; the logic of inferring future events from past record. We will not elaborate upon them here.(ref.5) Reference Carnap, Rudolf. The Logical Foundations of Probability. The University of Chicago Press (1962) (ref.6) Reference Jeffrey, Richard C.. Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press, [Vol.II] (1980) My goal is simply to suggest a method of reasoning about persuasion that can apply these techniques: where persuasion is defined as the actions necessary to increase the probability that one behavior will occur rather than another. We do this here in the context of Facebook and its functionality at the time of writing. §12 I will introduce concepts that enable us to identify conventions embodied by individuals. These concepts enable us to characterize the probability that a particular behavior will occur, in a range of exhibited behaviors, when an individual apprehends a mark. §13 All that would appear to be required to change behaviors is that we identify which individuals adopt a target behavior and the marks that caused them to do so. By applying those same marks to others that share the same conventions you will naturally increase the probability of the target behavior. §14 The marks we are considering here are the elements of Facebook. The conventions are simply user behaviors on Facebook. It is important to note that both of these can be measured. We essentially ask to what degree is it possible to identify conventions on Facebook to enable the above model. Semeiotics General theories of signs. §15 Let's begin with a few fundamental concepts that give us a general framework for thinking about behaviors and measures for quantifying them. §16 My model is a semeiotic Clarification semeiotic A general theory of signs. The study of the foundations of logic and apprehension. one. A semeiotic model deals with “signs Clarification sign An individuated experience. .” Signs, for our purposes here, are simply individuated experiences of any kind. The subjects of signs are “marks Clarification mark The subject of a sign. .” Whenever I speak of a mark I include reference to complex marks, marks that are composed of marks. §17 So, from the point of view of a semeiotic model, the elements of a Facebook profile are marks that produce signs in the individuals apprehending them. Our goal is to reason about the behavior that these marks produce. For our purposes, the meaning Clarification meaning The difference a mark makes in the world. of a mark is precisely the difference that the mark makes in the world; it is the unique behavior that it produces in its apprehension,(ref.7) Reference Peirce, Charles Sanders. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce: Pragmaticism. Belknap Press, Harvard, [Vol.V] (1931) . This behavior includes any embodied behaviors that create references and relations. This view is a strict interpretation of Charles Sanders Peirce's (1839-1911)“Pragmatic Maxim” which simply states that to identify meaning look for changes in the world. §18 We can now say that a mark has precisely the same meaning for individuals in which it produces precisely the same behavior (what this actually refers to in biological terms we leave unstated here). However, the important point is that some portion of this behavior is recorded on Facebook. §19 This gives us a way to reason in conventional terms about what people mean and, more generally, it enables us to reason about conventions. A convention then is simply the uniformity of behavior produced by a particular mark. So, we can now say, for example, that the profile image on a Facebook profile is a mark and that individuals that share a response to that mark share conventions.note:2 Note §20 We, as a culture, use the notion of “meaning” as a way of speaking about the behavior associated with marks. We say “What does this mean?” or “What do you mean by that?” In all cases when we speak of meaning, though it may not be immediately obvious, we are speaking about the behavior associated with a mark, the behavior a mark produces in its apprehension. We would do better to say “What conventional behavior does this mark suggest?” or “When you exhibit that behavior what response do you expect?” Some readers might object that this does not allow us to reason about relations or references but this is not the case. Both are a behavior embodied in the engineering of sentience and they are the products of apprehending marks. §21 This provides a simple measure that enables us to categorize friends on Facebook. If two friends behave in the same way to a modification of any element in a Facebook profile then they share conventions to some degree. To determine the full degree to which any group share conventions will obviously require more than one data point. Applied Semeiotics Using the simple model. §22 This is a pretty simple model but how useful is it. Clearly, if we were able to observe all the responses of individuals viewing a particular mark we would be able to group them into categories of individuals that share the same conventions. §23 Let's think of some examples. §24 We could perhaps place an image of our favorite emblematic personality in the profile picture and measure the number of friends we lose and the number that we gain as a result, the number that make comments of a certain kind and so forth. Thus the friending process is a behavior that reflects the conventions held by the individuals joining and leaving in response to the mark. You can try this out by changing your profile image to one of Adolf Hilter, Ghandi or Karl Marx, for example, and measuring the behavioral responses among your existing friends and the new friends you acquire. Those having similar responses share conventions, at least to the extent that they are observable and relate to the particular mark. §25 Considered use of this example may provide a useful mechanism for filtering a friends list. §26 This model enables us to identify which individuals in a group share conventions. As noted, you need more than one data point. Conducting experiments of this kind, and gathering extensive data, you can build a landscape of the conventions held by any given population. It should be clear that if you are Facebook Inc., or any other entity with monolithic access to social data, that you have access to such data and can conduct such experiments. §27 When you have a way to determine which individuals share conventions, and privileged access to behavioral data, you can construct a useful set of predictive categories. Comprehensive data within those categories of convention enables broad predictions and the ability to manipulate marks will enable the management of a society. §28 What are the predictions that such categories enable? §29 Individuals sharing conventions have a high probability of behaving in the same manner when exposed to a given mark. If you want an individual to respond in a particular way, then the simplest thing to do is to identify individuals in the same convention category that exhibited the desired behavior and apply the marks that produced that behavior to the individual you seek to “persuade.” §30 Therefore, once you have assembled individuals into these categories of convention only a little data is required to enable you to change the behavior of any and all individuals in that category. Pragmatic Solutions to Persuasion Keeping it simple. §31 This is all pretty simple stuff and we should not be surprised that technologists have tried to exploit ideas like this. §32 The notion of “collaborative filtering” tends, as a practical matter, to be based on readily accessible statistics, like Amazon's: “those that bought A also bought B.” §33 Let's briefly consider what is going on here in our terms because we see this approach used by a number of Facebook applications. The purchase by any individual of two products is a vote for the relationship between those products as marks and this is a useful fact. It reflects convention if it reflects broader behavior but its use is typically a pragmatic discovery. Such discoveries have obviously been valuable to Amazon. §34 A variety of web services have had mixed results with techniques that attempt to apply probability techniques of the kind I have referred to. Often these techniques claim to possess some form of “artificial intelligence” and they attempt to solve persuasion problems. Simply put, by showing you some mark, for example placing an advertisement in your Facebook news feed, they seek to produce some behavior. §35 Blanket offering of this kind work by sheer force of coverage; expose sufficient people to a mark and you will get the full variety of responses to it. But automated “intelligent” selections typically fail. The question is, why do they fail and can you, with your intelligence, do any better? Are there marks that you can place in your news feed that will produce some desired behavior in those apprehending them? If you can succeed where the probability models fail, what enables you to succeed? §36 The services that try to apply advanced probability techniques discover that the data they collect is simply incomplete. They cannot know, for example, about the books that you buy at other locations online or offline. So, even if they succeed in making offers that are 100% relevant, making offers that are redundant is a problem. This is especially the case if the offers actually make claims about the “intelligence” of the selection. §37 An Internet service that makes intelligence claims about redundant offers (offers that would interest you if only they had not already been fulfilled) is viewed negatively and this negativity propagates to the entire service. In the worst case, a service that makes intelligence claims and makes offers that are relevant anything less than 100% of the time is considered “stupid” regardless of the fact that it is right most of the time. note:3 Note §38 These observation are the product of the author's experience with users while building such services for RCA, Microsoft, Oracle, and others. §39 So, even though we have a compelling theory, we are limited in our ability to collect the full range of data required for it to be useful as a comprehensive persuasion tool. There are practical matters that limit what we can know and this limit the application of the theory. It remains an open and Orwellian question as to whether these are hard limits. §40 The simple pragmatic “those that bought/liked A also bought/liked B,” used by many Facebook applications, is not the product of a foundational theory. It is a pragmatic discovery. It makes no claim to intelligence, it is simple, informative, and allows the acceptance of redundancy. In this case redundant offers become affirming experiences. We say “Oh yes, I have that book and if people that bought that book bought this book too, then this book is one that is useful to me!” This same response encourages you to consider those other offered books that are not familiar. A General Theory of Behavior Extending the model. §41 What can we do with the minimum data that can be collected? How are our offers (the marks we use to evoke desired behavior) best presented to be effective? We are looking for two things: the target behaviors to which the theory can be applied, and why certain applications of it will be ineffective. §42 What we need is a general theory of behavior that will give us a more complete framework. Using this framework we may be able to identify reliable and futile mechanisms of “persuasion.” §43 While a semeiotic model deals with the operation of individual sentient entities (any kind of organism, including Facebook users), we need a more general way to consider the behavior of sentient entities in groups. I call such theories “Natural Ethics Clarification Natural Ethics The inevitable behavior of sentient organisms in groups defined by genetic disposition mitigated by convention. .” Natural Ethics deals with the inevitable behaviors of sentient entities in groups (it deals with what they will do, not with what they should do). Facebook users are such a group. §44 Natural Ethics have two components: genetic disposition Clarification genetic disposition I am referring to the inevitable behavior of an organism in its environment as determined by its physical structure which, as we know, is a function of genetics. and convention. We discussed convention earlier, now let's consider the dispositions of individuals that are defined solely by who they are physically and, in particular, ask which of these dispositions are reflected in behavior that is influenced by interaction with Facebook. §45 There are a couple of obvious candidates, so for the sake of brevity let's focus our attention upon them. They are: Mating behavior, more generally reproduction and raising children. Eating behavior, more generally sustaining ourselves physically. §46 These are the two indisputable genetic dispositions. We can potentially add more but let's keep it simple. §47 Note that I have said nothing about broader social behaviors here. This is essentially because the model treats individuals as the element of any broader social behavior and takes the position that any consideration of community is the consideration of individuals. By this means we avoid metaphysical pitfalls often associated with reasoning about social behavior. We reason about broader social behavior when using the probability mechanisms described earlier. These allow us to work from the basic assumption that individuals that embody like conventions behave similarly. §48 I then take the position that in the absence of convention the behavior of all organisms in species is inevitable Clarification inevitable I define “inevitable behavior” as behavior that is the product of the engineering of sentience. It differs from “deterministic behavior” only in so far as engineering by classical mechanics differs from the engineering of sentience. I will not go into the full reasons here why I draw such a distinction but it should be clear that there are, in fact, such distinctions at least as far as it is evidenced by the engineering of organisms according to genetics. , determined by their physical form in the environment in which they find themselves. §49 This position always raises the question of “free-will.” So for clarity I will note that our definition here of free will is simply that it is the navigation of ignorance; if we always knew the right thing to do, then there is no doubt that we would do it (and this applies regardless of a hesitant disposition. I am referring here to an absolute knowing of “the right thing”, as certain as any natural law). Our “choices” are determined by the behavioral model I have described: genetic disposition mitigated by convention. §50 It is reasonable to anticipate, therefore, that in the absence of convention organisms will mate and eat. Or more generally, they will reproduce and sustain themselves. Conventions serve to make this behavior more orderly, more efficient. §51 How are these dispositions manifest on Facebook? §52 The most obvious genetic disposition is, perhaps, the mating disposition which is reflected in the range of interactions around reproductive behavior. But we also find behavior designed to meet the eating disposition. The outcomes then, from the point of view of genetic disposition only, that conventions present on Facebook potentially mediate are: Dinner Income Sex Childbirth Marriage §53 Without convention we can reasonably assume that these dispositions prevail and that the drive for them without convention is determined only by the degree to which these needs are currently met by the environment. §54 Facebook, like all media, is a vehicle of convention only. It does not fulfill these dispositions directly. So to speak about the behavior surrounding Facebook we have to ask what role convention plays in the characterization of these dispositions. §55 Quite simply, in a general theory of organism behavior, conventions (as we have defined them in the foregoing) mitigate genetic dispositions. Here “mitigation” refers to the increase or decrease in the behavioral effect of these natural dispositions, in the range of behaviors that are the possible products of the disposition. §56 Conventions do not bring new behaviors into the world. They only modify behaviors that are the product of genetic dispositions, behaviors associated simply with biological structures in their environment. Familiarity The role of the familiar and how we deal with that which is not familiar. §57 In terms of Facebook then, individuals respond as they would to any other mark in their interaction with the world. Facebook is more effective than a traditional form of social communication, say by posted letter, because it provides a vehicle for rich media and interaction mechanisms that are always available, immediate and reflect interaction behavior between proximate individuals in the world. This rich media increases our familiarity with their subject. §58 It will be argued, of course, that other services provide rich media and interaction mechanisms, so what is different about Facebook that enabled its wide adoption? §59 Fogg and others note correctly that Facebook has provided an environment of “trust.” It has done this by enabling transparency and eliminating anonymity. This is important because it more accurately reflects the familiarity protocols of the natural environment. The environment of trust arises from the greater familiarity that Facebook enables. §60 Familiarity is a property of “semeiosis Clarification semeiosis The operation of “the mind,” the mechanics of apprehension, of sign processing and response, of sense and motility ”, which for our purposes here we will simply define as the operation of the mind; it is the processing of signs. It is what is going on inside the individuals in the model I have described so far. Familiarity is simply the degree to which we have adopted a behavior in response to a mark.note:4 Note §61 Charles Sanders Peirce would have referred to this degree to which we have adopted a behavior as “habit.” This is initialized by the innate familiarity to the environment provided by genetic disposition and subsequently modified by convention. §62 We know intuitively how to deal with that which is familiar, by definition. We rely upon convention to help us deal with that which is not familiar. In this case, the marks of convention identify categories that we become familiar with, and those categories modify our behavior in the variety of circumstances that involve that which is not familiar. §63 So, for example, we trust strangers to treat us in times of crisis because they are identified by the mark “Doctor” or “Nurse.” We select strangers to attend to our teeth and teach our children, all by convention; common responses to marks that help us deal with individuals whose services we need but who are in all other respects not familiar to us. §64 These same dynamics apply on Facebook. Facebook enables us to reinforce our familiarity with those we are already familiar with. And it enables us to strengthen our familiarity with those we are only weakly familiar with. §65 Since we rely upon familiarity and conventions that allow us to navigate that which is not familiar, Facebook's environment as far as it ensures transparency and eliminates anonymity is a good and valuable social tool. And in general, this mechanism of convention provides social animals, such as our species, with extraordinary advantages. Navigating the Unfamiliar Things to watch out for. §66 However, the mechanisms that provide us with these advantages are also the source of great risk. A mechanism provided by Facebook, or any similar platform that undermines our ability to rely upon these conventions, inhibits our ability to navigate the unfamiliar. §67 Conventions are undermined when unexpected events occur that force individuals to reassess their response to a mark.note:5 Note Indeed, this is the case when that mark is an individual in the social group. In these circumstances they will pass from predictable probabilistic behavior to random behavior when the mark appears. Alternatively, if other conventions were previously embodied, they will revert to them. §68 Imagine this situation in a non-virtual environment. You arrive at a party and there are many people there that will not tell you their real name. A few claim to be qualified doctors and nurses, priests and elected officials. If you are a conventional Westerner you won't be able to help yourself. You will trust the “qualified individuals” and distrust the anonymous individuals. Such are our conventions and our innate dispositions. §69 However, the true situation at this party is that the people that are anonymous are in danger. They are simply protecting themselves and they have something important to tell you. The qualified individuals are imposters. §70 Before the Internet it was the convention of “free speech” that anonymity was the haven of last resort for people at risk. Individuals claimed anonymity only as a cloak of protection for their safety and that of their families. It was a valuable convention because it enabled them to say what could not otherwise be said. It enabled them to alert us to betrayal. §71 When the conventional cloak of anonymity is made ineffective because it is so readily available it becomes impossible to detect the sincere alert to danger. It denies protection to those that truly need it. As a consequence it undermines the freedom of speech in a society. §72 Wikipedia is an example of these dangers. It is impossible to determine the real identity of contributors and therefore their conflicts of interest and the true merit of their contributions. Wikipedia is useful at points in its uncertain history and this lulls us into a false sense of security. The sources have neither the advantage of being truly familiar, nor are there attributable conventions that would allow us to trust the unfamiliar source. §73 The great strength of the Facebook model is that it provides transparency and thus a relatively secure environment for identity; people are who they say they are. This encourages individuals to strengthen their familiarity with each other. §74 It should be obvious that it takes a lot to undermine a convention and that familiarity has great power. §75 Someone that poses as a qualified dentist and later turns out to be qualified as a car mechanic is unlikely to be trusted to care for your teeth again; no matter how good a job they actually do on your teeth. But this is unlikely to stop you from seeking out a new dentist on the same basis as you used to select the first. Conversely, if you become sufficiently familiar with the car mechanic then the strength of that familiarity allows you to reject convention and allow the car mechanic to continue to treat your teeth. §76 We all know how to deal with that which is familiar, by definition. You are more able to navigate that society, and you are more productive in it, the more familiarity you have. If you are not at all familiar within that society then you are totally dependent upon convention. If you are familiar you will have less dependence upon convention. §77 Our dependency upon familiarity and conventions for managing that which is not familiar makes us vulnerable in environments where convention can be undermined and familiarity falsely acquired. §78 Celebrity, incidentally, is simply the product of familiarity. The power of familiarity is readily seen. For example, in the election of the California Governor the policies and performance of Arnold Schwarzenegger were and are irrelevant. This is limited to some bounds that essentially require that Schwarzenegger maintains familiar behaviors. His broad familiarity then makes his re-election as California's Governor simply inevitable. To beat Schwarzenegger has nothing to do with policies. It simply requires a candidate that is more familiar or uncharacteristic behavior on the part of Schwarzenegger. Conclusion §79 I introduced foundational theories of behavior and applied them to Facebook as a medium of social interaction. I observed that the primary strength of Facebook, and this may be the cause of its success, is that it enables the currency of familiarity by providing a platform for its development and use. §80 Specifically, I first described a simple model of behavior: individuals act in response to marks. I then generalized this idea to enable the identification of convention as the uniformity of responses to marks in groups of individuals. I then noted that we rely upon convention to inform us in our dealings with that which is unfamiliar. §81 According to this model Facebook's advantage is that it enables the strengthening of familiarity. That, in turn, strengthens social interactions and enables mechanisms of persuasion. §82 It should also be clear that the dependence upon convention is reduced for those rich with the currency of familiarity. The establishment of “conventions” by groups of familiar individuals assists in the navigation of that which is not familiar. §83 I noted that the measurable outcomes from interaction through Facebook include dinner and the birth of a child. These are measurable outcomes of any social environment and under any circumstances (by definition) satisfying and productive social environments, such as Facebook, have improved probability of these outcomes. They will occur where they would not otherwise have occurred. §84 I have suggested that with broad and sufficient historical data it is possible to identify what you need to modify on your Facebook profile to achieve these outcomes. I have also added a note of caution. While there are clear social benefits for individuals to the increased liquidity of the currency of familiarity, a platform for that currency, according to this model, enables social behaviors to be observed, predicted and modified. Such a platform is potentially the ultimate tool of mass persuasion.

End Notes

^note:1 As measured by its growth and commercial success.

^note:2 We, as a culture, use the notion of “meaning” as a way of speaking about the behavior associated with marks. We say “What does this mean?” or “What do you mean by that?” In all cases when we speak of meaning, though it may not be immediately obvious, we are speaking about the behavior associated with a mark, the behavior a mark produces in its apprehension. We would do better to say “What conventional behavior does this mark suggest?” or “When you exhibit that behavior what response do you expect?” Some readers might object that this does not allow us to reason about relations or references but this is not the case. Both are a behavior embodied in the engineering of sentience and they are the products of apprehending marks.

^note:3 These observation are the product of the author's experience with users while building such services for RCA, Microsoft, Oracle, and others.

^note:4 Charles Sanders Peirce would have referred to this degree to which we have adopted a behavior as “habit.”

Concepts

genetic disposition: I am referring to the inevitable behavior of an organism in its environment as determined by its physical structure which, as we know, is a function of genetics.

inevitable: I define “inevitable behavior” as behavior that is the product of the engineering of sentience. It differs from “deterministic behavior” only in so far as engineering by classical mechanics differs from the engineering of sentience. I will not go into the full reasons here why I draw such a distinction but it should be clear that there are, in fact, such distinctions at least as far as it is evidenced by the engineering of organisms according to genetics.

mark: The subject of a sign.

meaning: The difference a mark makes in the world.

Natural Ethics: The inevitable behavior of sentient organisms in groups defined by genetic disposition mitigated by convention.

semeiosis: The operation of “the mind,” the mechanics of apprehension, of sign processing and response, of sense and motility

semeiotic: A general theory of signs. The study of the foundations of logic and apprehension.

sign: An individuated experience.

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Implant Pentru Refuz...

"Let the will of the state act, then, instead of that of the individual. Let an institution be created which shall have for its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention of the people, to reiterate them perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to prevent contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed. Let all possible causes of a change of mind be removed from men's apprehensions. Let them be kept ignorant, lest they should learn of some reason to think otherwise than they do. Let their passions be enlisted, so that they may regard private and unusual opinions with hatred and horror." [Charles Peirce, The Fixation of Belief]

Deductie - Inductie - Abductie

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DEDUCTIE-

"O deductie rezulta intotdeauna in mod necesar si este comparabila cu o actualizare instrumentala ce nu pune probleme.


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INDUCTIE-

Inductia denumeste testarea unei teoriisi observarea corelatiei dintre teorie si fapte. Ea clasifica lucruri existente si constituie astfel fundamentul proceselor de abstractizare instrumentala.


(

ABDUCTIE-

Abductia este o operatie de rezolvare indrazneata si orientata teleologic care corespunde mecanismului abstractizarii instrumentale accidentale. Se produce astfel trecerea dinspre tipologie cognitiva a actelor de transfer catre o organizare logica a acestora. " *

(G.Kohn - 'Echivalenta ca proiect al traducatorului', 2006)


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* "Abductia porneste de la fapte, fara a avea, de la inceput, in vedere o anumita teorie, desi e motivata de sentimentul ca o teorie e necesara pentru a explica faptele surprinzatoare. Inductia porneste de la o ipoteza ce pare a se impune de la sine, fara a avea de la inceput in vedere o serie de fapte particulare, desi nevoia de fapte se face simtita pentru a sprijini teoria. Abductia isi propune sa ajunga la o teorie. Inductia isi propune sa ajunga la fapte. In cazul abductiei examinarea faptelor sugereaza ipoteza. In cazul inductiei studiul ipotezei sugereaza experimentele care scot la lumina chiar acele fapte pe care le-a sugerat ipoteza." (Ch.Sanders Peirce, apud, Sebeok/sebeok, 1994, p.41).

vagueness vs. generality (Peirce EP2:342 & EP2:350)

found this excerpt via Gnox on Peirceforums.

" I think it's clear from EP2:350 ff. that vagueness and generality are both varieties of "objective indeterminacy". My question about "subjective generality" referred to this passage (EP:342):

[[[ ...there are two ways of being general. A statue of a soldier on some village monument, in his overcoat and with his musket, is for each of a hundred families the image of its uncle, its sacrifice to the Union.

That statue, then, though it is itself single, represents any one man of whom a certain predicate may be true. It is objectively general. The word "soldier", whether spoken or written, is general in the same way; while the name "George Washington", is not so. But each of these two terms remains one and the same noun, whether it be spoken or written, and whenever and wherever it be spoken or written. This noun is not an existing thing: it is a type, or form, to which objects, both those that are externally existent and those which are imagined, may conform, but which none of them can exactly be.

This is subjective generality.

The pragmaticistic purport is general in both ways. ]]]


The statue is objectively general because the interpreter has the privilege of applying it to the object of his choice (within appropriate limits, of course). "Subjective generality", on the other hand seems to be an alternate way of referring to the type/token relationship -- the difference between forms and existing things -- as it pertains to the sign itself rather than its object.

[[[ EP:350-3

...It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe, -- not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth", -- that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. Let us note this in passing as having a bearing upon the question of pragmaticism. ]]]

It is not clear to me (1( how the universe being perfused with signs explains the phenomenon of generality; or (2( what bearing this has upon the question of pragmaticism. "

sig.:

''''You are really the natural form of emptiness, so there is no need to fear.[Tibetan Bok of the Dead]""

--------------------------------

grey - Myself
black - Gnox
bold - Peirce
[ e m p t y / white space ] - Yourself ( the reader / interpretant )

terms:

*the general* ==
the objectively general, to which the princile of excluded middle does not apply, has its sign chosen by the interpreter
(P's ex. Man is mortal. Which man? Any one -- or all ! -- you, the interpreter, choose).

Also, the general is not particular, but (tends toward) precision. In logical notation, the upside down A.


*the vague* ==
the objectively indeterminate, to which the principle of contradiction does not apply, has its sign in some other sign
(P's ex. I say some man is conceited. Which man? You shall -- perhaps! -- later learn; but the utterer, NOT the interpreter, has the right to choose which man).

Also, the vague is not precise, but (tends towards) particularity. Upside down E.


*the determinate*==
the objectively determinate, to which both the above mentioned principles apply, is singular, has its sign in some particular & precise individual
(GR's ex., my immediate object is of this dynamic object, the man before me; the utterer IS the thing-itself, so to speak).

Upside down E!

-----------------------------

§ Categorially §

E -- vague, indefinite, indeterminate yet particular, 1ns

|>A -- general, in the universal sense, 3ns

E! -- singular, determinate 2ns

§ Vectorially §

*semiosis* ( the object determines the sign for the interpreter )

Ilya Prigogine

Ilya Prigogine ( wiki page )

Abduction explained --> via Peirce Studies Helsinki

"Let us now consider non-necessary reasoning. This divides itself, according to the different ways in which it may be valid, into three classes: probable deduction; experimental reasoning, which I now call Induction; and processes of thought capable of producing no conclusion more definite than a conjecture, which I now call Abduction.

[---]
Abduction is no more nor less than guessing, a faculty attributed to Yankees. [---] Such validity as this has consists in the generalization that no new truth is ever otherwise reached while some new truths are thus reached. This is a result of Induction; and therefore in a remote way Abduction rests upon diagrammatic reasoning." ('PAP (Prolegomena for an Apology to Pragmatism)' (MS 293), NEM 4:319-320, c. 1906)

"... there are but three elementary kinds of reasoning. The first, which I call abduction (on the theory, the doubtful theory, I confess, that the meaning of the XXVth chapter of the second book of the Prior Analytics has been completely diverted from Aristotle's meaning by a single wrong word having been inserted by Apellicon where the original word was illegible) consists in examining a mass of facts and in allowing these facts to suggest a theory. In this way we gain new ideas; but there is no force in the reasoning.

[---] ... induction is, as Aristotle says, the inference of the truth of the major premiss of a syllogism of which the minor premiss is made to be true and the conclusion is found to be true, while abduction is the inference of the truth of the minor premiss of a syllogism of which the major premiss is selected as known already to be true while the conclusion is found to be true. Abduction furnishes all our ideas concerning real things, beyond what are given in perception, but is mere conjecture, without probative force." (A Letter to Calderoni, CP 8.209, c. 1905)...

more on this subject (and many more) here -> HelsinkiPeirceStudies - very nice site

THERE ARE MANY WAYS OF BEING ALIVE BUT ONLY ONE OF BEING DEAD?

A living individual is an object of this world that tends to conserve its own identity, independently from the fluctuations of the rest of the world [ENVIRONMENT]. And the environment does indeed change. ADAPTATION is the ability to withstand the typical changes of the environment. INDEPENDENCE [or ADAPTABILITY] is the ability to withstand new changes. ADAPTATION refers to the certainty of the environment, ADAPTABILITY to its uncertainty.

They are not the same thing. We could even say that more of the former means less of the latter.

The uncertainty of the world is its greatest certainty.

So if there is a one question worth asking, it is this:
HOW CAN ONE STAY ALIVE IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT?

Perhaps the key to understanding biological evolution is not the concept of ADAPTATION but that of INDEPENDENCE. The idea is promising, because physics and mathematics, their laws and theorems, operate not in terms of ADAPTATION but of INDEPENDENCE.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I felt an urge to re-read some notes of mine from my older journals. This introductory note of Jorge Wagensbergs paper on the three states of independence really caught my attention back then and made me re-read it now after 4 years after first discovering it... Re-reading the material with a fresh pair of eyes made me see much more in those sentences, now filtering his statements through Ilya Prigogene's theory of irreversible thermodynamics and Fritjof Capra's Minimal life's statements.

The Baader Meinhof Phenomenon

You may have heard about Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon before. In fact, you probably learned about it for the first time very recently. If not, then you just might hear about it again very soon. Baader-Meinhof is the phenomenon where one happens upon some obscure piece of information– often an unfamiliar word or name– and soon afterwards encounters the same subject again, often repeatedly. Anytime the phrase "That's so weird, I just heard about that the other day" would be appropriate, the utterer is hip-deep in Baader-Meinhof.

Most people seem to have experienced the phenomenon at least a few times in their lives, and many people encounter it with such regularity that they anticipate it upon the introduction of new information. But what is the underlying cause? Is there some hidden meaning behind Baader-Meinhof events?

The phenomenon bears some similarity to synchronicity, which is the experience of having a highly meaningful coincidence… such as having someone telephone you while you are thinking about them. Both phenomena invoke a feeling of mild surprise, and cause one to ponder the odds of such an intersection. Both smack of destiny, as though the events were supposed to occur in just that arrangement… as though we're witnessing yet another domino tip over in a chain of dominoes beyond our reckoning.

Despite science's cries that a world as complex as ours invites frequent coincidences, observation tells us that such an explanation is inadequate. Observation shows us that Baader-Meinhof strikes with blurring accuracy, and too frequently to be explained away so easily. But over the centuries, observation has also shown us that observation itself is highly flawed, and not to be trusted.

The reason for this is our brains' prejudice towards patterns. Our brains are fantastic pattern recognition engines, a characteristic which is highly useful for learning, but it does cause the brain to lend excessive importance to unremarkable events. Considering how many words, names, and ideas a person is exposed to in any given day, it is unsurprising that we sometimes encounter the same information again within a short time. When that occasional intersection occurs, the brain promotes the information because the two instances make up the beginnings of a sequence. What we fail to notice is the hundreds or thousands of pieces of information which aren't repeated, because they do not conform to an interesting pattern. This tendency to ignore the "uninteresting" data is an example of selective attention.

In point of fact, coincidences themselves are usually just an artifact of perception. We humans tend to underestimate the probability of coinciding events, so our expectations are at odds with reality. And non-coincidental events do not grab our attention with anywhere near the same intensity, because coincidences are patterns, and the brain actually stimulates us for successfully detecting patterns… hence their inflated value. In short, patterns are habit-forming.

But when we hear a word or name which we just learned the previous day, it often feels like more than a mere coincidence. This is because Baader-Meinhof is amplified by the recency effect, a cognitive bias that inflates the importance of recent stimuli or observations. This increases the chances of being more aware of the subject when we encounter it again in the near future.

How the phenomenon came to be known as "Baader-Meinhof" is uncertain. It seems likely that some individual learned of the existence of the historic German urban guerrilla group which went by that name, and then heard the name again soon afterwards. This plucky wordsmith may then have named the phenomenon after the very subject which triggered it. But it is certainly a mouthful; a shorter name might have more hope of penetrating the lexicon.

However it came to be known by such a name, it is clear that Baader-Meinhof is yet another charming fantasy whose magic is diluted by stick-in-the-mud science and its sinister cohort: facts. But if you've never heard of the phenomenon before, be sure to watch for it in the next few days… brain stimulation is nice.

Via Damn Interresting

Also see the Serial Position effect

http://ensemble.va.com.au/enslogic/text/smn_lct09.htm

Ushenko's Field Theory Of Meaning

I will suggest that as the vuser of a Recombinant Poetic system, we become one with that system and intermingle with it. Thus the outcome of the interaction is a result of what we bring to the situation in terms of our mindset "field" and what the initial author has translated into the system in terms of combinatorial possibilities and aesthetic processes; another set of fields. This differs from Ushenko's concept of a kind of opposition between the "object" and the "percipient." Ushenko intimates:

The dynamics of the exhibition, i.e. the enactment, is two-directional. On the one hand we face the external object; on the other hand the object confronts us. The outward direction of perception, from the percipient to the object is met an opposed by the inward direction, from the object to the percipient. Unlike a memory image which is with us, along with other resources with witch we face things, the external original thing is independent of percipients and, to that extent is against us. The complementarity of being with and against us, is the dual set of direction in an enactment of externality. (Ushenko, 1958, p. 21)

In his book, The Field Theory of Meaning, Ushenko tries to directly map the vectors of physics onto meaning processes. This has very interesting ramifications but unfortunately he died before bringing these concepts to a full understanding. I will below speak about the ramifications of some of his concepts.

In terms of combinatorial environments, where the nature of context is in flux, there is an interest in poetic ambiguity. A number of factors contribute to this continuous state of shift. The experiential ReP work, entitled "The World Generator / The Engine of Desire" has revealed that each layer of content found within a work incorporating language, image, or sound elements becomes a potential shifting, accumulated field of focus. In ReP works, this shift is heightened by employing chosen poetic elements that exhibit a specific ambiguity, although such ambiguity can be said to be characteristic of language use in general. Historically we can point to Saussure as initiating the discussion related to the arbitrariness of the sign as described in his Course of General Linguistics compiled by students of his. In recombinant poetic works the "sign is arbitrary." (Saussure, 1983, p.67) The signifier may stay the same but the signified will shift in relation to context. In terms of change over time, Saussure states "whatever the factors involved in [the] change, whether they act in isolation or in combination, they always result in a shift in the relationship between the signal and the signification." (Saussure, 1983, p. 75) This "shift" is enhanced by employing poetic media-elements that exhibit specific ambiguity, thus I am not only exploring the qualities of textual shift as referred to by Saussure.

Recontextualisation of chosen and/or authored linguistic signs, leading to alternate readings, forms one example of the principle which enables the viewer to explore recombinant fields of meaning. Various aspects of condensed potential content are activated during navigation. In relation to this phenomena of shift, Andrew Brown contributes an interesting observation in his reading of Roland Barthes' autobiography: "Barthes himself refers in the text to the process of making an index: it involves working on and with names, revealing their arbitrariness, their limitations, and their power to frame reading and writing." (Brown, 1992) The nature of reframing or shift employed in recombinant poetic works has led me to formulate the concept of "oscillating meaning."

Yet such framing is employed in an extralinguistic manner within my techno-poetic mechanism.

In Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design, Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen talk about a relation between the visual image and writing as expressed by Barthes which is also relevant to this discussion.

We want to treat forms of communication treating visual images more seriously then they have hitherto been treated. We have come to this position because of the overwealming evidence of the importance of visual communication, and the staggering inability on all our parts to talk and think in a way seriously about what is actually communicated by means of images and visual design.

In doing so, we have to move away from the position which Roland Barthes took in his essay 'Rhetoric of the Image,' (1977). In this essay (and elsewhere, as in the introduction to Elements of Semiology, 1967) Barthes argued that the meaning of images (and of other semniotic codes, like dress, food, etc.) is always related to, and in a sense, dependent on, verbal text. By themselves, images are too 'polysemous', to open to a variety of possible meanings. To arrive at a definite meaning, language must come to the rescue. Visual meaning is too indefinite, it is a 'floating chain of signifieds'. Hence, Barthes said "in every society various techniques are developed intended to fix the floating chain of signifieds in such a way as to counter the terror of uncertain signs; the linguistic message is one of these techniques." (Barthes, 1977, p. 39) He distinguished between an image-text relation in which the verbal text extends the meaning of the image, or vice versa. As in the case, for example, of speech ballons in comic strips, and an image-text relation in which the verbal text elaborates the image, or vice versa. In the former case which he calls relay, new and different meanings are added to complete the image. In the latter case, the same meanings are restated in a different (e.g. more definite and precise) way, as in the case of , for example, when a caption identifies and/or interprets what is shown in a photograph. Of the two, elaboration is dominant. Relay, said Barthes, is 'more rare'. He distinguished two types of elaboration, one in which the verbal text comes first, so that the image forms an illustration of it, and one in which the image comes first, so that the text forms a more definite and precise restatement or 'fixing' of it (a relation he calls anchorage). (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 16)

It is quite obvious that the notion of "anchorage" in the age of the hyper-link and virtual space, the morph etc., is no longer adequate to address the un-fixity of the recombinant sign. The metaphor of surfing often employed in the discussion of cyberspace navigation, is about mobility, passage, linkage, processes of association, 'lines of flight'(see Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.21) and "relay." I am not suggesting that I want to destroy the precision of language-image relations. On the contrary I seek to observe their actual complexity, in relation to mutability in techno-poetic environments. In terms of media-elements within environments that are mutable or reconfigurable, no single media-element is potentially more important than another. In fact, various hyperlinks, virtual proximities, and/or trajectories through media, as chosen by an interactant, can potentially (if not willfully) shift the "anchorage."

Thus, content is always potential content in such works, arising during use. The notion that poetic elements carry a series of alternating potential meanings, is central to the poetic strategies employed in my recombinant works. Ushenko presents two differeing kinds of literature in his book The Field Theory of Meaning; a "Literature of Knowledge," one that seeks to alleviate ambiguity as well as a "Literature of Power," one that embraces such ambiguity. The following is an example of what Ushenko sees as problematic in his "Literature of Knowledge" - a form of scientific nomenclature:

To begin with examples, we obviously cannot specify-and, therefore, do not understand- the meaning of such a word as "vice," since such words are in different contexts with altogether different meanings. The word "vice" may mean a vise, i.e. a tool for holding an object tight, but it may mean a fault or depravity, and it may mean what is mean by the phrase "instead of." It would not help us to observe that such a word as "vice" is a homonym which telescopes within the same visual pattern several different words, each of which is a carrier of a distinct unambiguous meaning. In the first place, unaided by context, the reader cannot tell which of the several alternative meanings he is supposed to choose. And, second, even if an arbitrary choice were allowed- in disregard of the already accepted requirement for objective and communicable meanings- the choice would not provide for an altogether ambiguous word. (Usenko, 1958, p. 29 - 30)

In counterdistinction to Ushenko, I am very much interested in the nature of ambiguity as a poetic vehicle. I am also interested in how meaning is emergent over time, within particular contexts. By intentionally loading a system with a resonant selection of specific ambiguous words, each with multiple potential meanings, one can experientially observe how the meaning is emergent in relation to context with a ReP work. This functions as an artistic constraint. Instead of saying this word is meaningless, I would say that it simultaneously carries all of its potential meanings in a state of suspended animation. It is this nature that enables Usenko to list his different potential readings of the word. If it was meaningless, he could find no such definition. Thus as a context arises, we search through our memory of useage patterns, and apply that which is most appropriate. It is human nature to try to find meaning within an exchange. This is the nature of association and understanding.

In terms of pictorial elements, I am intentionally loading the system with computer-graphic objects that will suggest alternate readings of particular juxtaposed words over time, thus an emergent, time-based context of potential meaning is generated. It is

important to recognise this in terms of the cut / copy / paste world of postmodernism. Snippets of information are constantly encountered in hypertexts. We do not begin with the assumption that they are meaningless, we seek the construction of the context to narrow the meaning - to specify it. This is especially true in the employment of pun which "vice" can potentially function as.

Usenko above is talking about his "literature of knowledge," one that seeks to alleviate ambiguity. He later speaks of the "Literature of Power" which is more in line with my project:

But I would rather wave the point in order to call attention to the fact that the ambiguity of a pun, which is a species of aesthetic ambivalence, is not the objectional ambiguity of a single informative word. The objectionalble ambiguity is a cause of mental confusion. The words of a pun are used with with a definite meaning in the sense that they are used with a definite double meaning. The mind grasps both components of a double meaning without confusing them. (Ushenko, 1958, p.36 & 37)

It is this sense of multiple meaning that I am interested in, which shows Ushenko to be slightly contradictory in terms of his discussion of fields of meaning. It is the operative nature of the media in ReP works that enables the viewer to experientially generate context. Ushenko states:

In the literature of power there is much to be said in favor of the extreme contextualists position. In the course of reading a poem context may compel us to revise our original understanding of certain lines.(Ushenko, 1958, p47)

It is this very aspect of observing the nature of context construction that Recombinant Poetic mechanism seeks to make observable in an experiential manner.

Where Usenko speaks of the sentence as a unit of meaning he is takling about " Literature of Knowledge." and not about the "Literature of Power" as he calls it. In poetic space a single word can carry potential meaning. In fact if we are to make an analogy to atoms, then I would suggest that even letters can carry potential meaning arrived at in the mind of the viewer. We can look toward Saussure for an example of this. Saussure recognised in a formal manner the ambiguity inherent to the use of language. His studies into the anagram, suggest that the letters of a word, when reorganised through external processes, can have bearing on the layering of meaning in an individual term. This, we most note is a re-combinational, time-based organisation. Thus if we are to take the "Field" analogy from physics, I think it necessary to extend the analogy to subatomic realm. The question is, how do we deal with the fact that the word is always either energy or matter. We are then speaking about both an actual field in Physics layered together with and propogating a conceptual field in Linguistics. One could ask how these two different kinds of fields intermingle with each other. Such a question is outside of the scope of this paper.

It is my contentention that all language depends on context for understanding. In the use of language, it is not only the notion that we "revise" our understanding - we actually augment or layer it with previous understandings derived from alternate contexts. We could say that thought is a kind of summing and cross referencing of the useage of all words, images, sounds and sensations from all past contexts or patterns of use that are made available to us through memory. Ushenko suggests the following:

In a literary piece, at any rate, a dynamic image does not vanish into nothingness but escapes the specification test of objectivity through fading out of focus but not without reverberations in the successors to imaginal prominence which, therefore, whould be said to preserve its presence even though in a virtual or attenuated mode." (Usenko, 1958, p.135)

This notion of a persistance of "presence" takes on an interesting role in the volatile electronic environment that characterises Recombinant Poetics.

"With this conclusion I want to establish the analogy between the transformation of ambivalent being into unambiguous perceptual manifestation, on the one hand, and the transformation of the ambiguous words into the meaning of the statement, on the other. In both transformations, initial ambivalence or ambiguity goes with the excess of alternate sets of content, and the unambiguous result is obtained by the omission of alternatives or elimination of excess." (Ushenko, 1958, p.143)

Recombinant Poetics seeks to experientially manifest situations in which the properties or nature of this "excess" can be examined. It is the my contention that such excess is common to communication and thus the study of how it arises is central to a contemporary understanding of the function of language in differing contexts or contexts augemented by additional images, sounds and/or additional qualifying language. I find this especially relevant in regard to the fact that such "excessive" languge is commonly used in poetic construction. To this end Ushenko says the following:

Even ambiguity is in order provided it is contextually controlled and, therefore, causes no confusion; in an exposure of depth and complexity the text of a poem invites alternative interpretations to be played against one another. In short, in a setting of art, the contextually controlled dynamic concreteness of concepts is most conspicuous. (Ushenko, 1958, p.162)

It is this very nature of exploring the "contextually controlled dynamic" of a work of art which is extended via my computer- based mechanism. Thus moving through a series of meaning states the user of the system can witness how complex meanings are emergent through personal interaction with the context as well as through chance mediation and pre-programmed processes. One can metaphorically invoke Heisenberg here where the observer effects the observed. This can be taken on a subtle level or on the level of human understanding in terms of what the vuser brings to the conceptual / physical experience of such an environment.

Association and play by the viewer is central to the process of exploring the techno-poetic mechanism. As media-elements are combined, both in real time and through temporal arrangement, a depth of experience is generated. I have constructed this resonant depth as a set of potentials through a specific loading of the fields; it is completed within the experience of the viewer as they conceptually bridge, disrupt, position and navigate through exploration of the techno-poetic mechanism. Meaning/becoming in this work of art is temporary, mobile, contextual.

Conclusion

Each field as explored in the techno-poetic mechnism could be described as a content probability field. Probability fields have a potentiality of signification and are dependent on context for their "reading" or legibility. Thus the perception and activity of the user of the interactive techno-poetic system drives the potential signification of media-elements. This relation between vuser and inter-authored environment, forms an on-going process of meaning/becoming. This text functions as an initial linguistic frame or perspective as a means of approaching and observing such an elusive environment; one predicated by non-closure.

Such a conception of artistic expression is not anchored by language in that it includes and takes into consideration all of the media-elements described above, functioning in an inter-signifying manner. What is suggested through this paper is the need of the formulation of a contemporary theory of environmental meaning as related to meaning/becoming, as it is generated and explored within computer-based environments. Such a theory is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper functions as an elaborate seed node... pointing toward the generation of an extremely complex, emergent inter-operative field of fields. An emergent field of meaning/becoming that enables the examination this conflation of language modes through an authored Recombinant Poetic work of art.

*Pragmatics traces its illustrious ancestry to the pre-socratic Greek dialecticians, then via Aristotle to Locke, Kant and Peirce, eventually to 19th Century phenomenologists, and --last but not least--to Ludwig Wittgenstein. In cognitive psychology, pragmatics underlies figure-ground perception, primed storage and malleable recall, attended ('context-scanning') information processing, and flexible ('prototype') categorization. In linguistics, pragmatics animates the study of contextual meaning and metaphoric extension, frame semantics and the semiotics of grammar-in-discourse, the sociology of language, and the acquisition of communicative competence. In anthropology, pragmatics is reflected in the exploration of cultural relativity, ethnomethodology and in cross-cultural cognition. (Giv—n, 1989, Preface)