some very nice iterations on error.
Fail the first time, next time fail better.
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Monday, July 6, 2009
Friday, July 3, 2009
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Deductie - Inductie - Abductie
.
DEDUCTIE-
"O deductie rezulta intotdeauna in mod necesar si este comparabila cu o actualizare instrumentala ce nu pune probleme.
,
INDUCTIE-
Inductia denumeste testarea unei teoriisi observarea corelatiei dintre teorie si fapte. Ea clasifica lucruri existente si constituie astfel fundamentul proceselor de abstractizare instrumentala.
(
ABDUCTIE-
Abductia este o operatie de rezolvare indrazneata si orientata teleologic care corespunde mecanismului abstractizarii instrumentale accidentale. Se produce astfel trecerea dinspre tipologie cognitiva a actelor de transfer catre o organizare logica a acestora. " *
(G.Kohn - 'Echivalenta ca proiect al traducatorului', 2006)
-----------------------
* "Abductia porneste de la fapte, fara a avea, de la inceput, in vedere o anumita teorie, desi e motivata de sentimentul ca o teorie e necesara pentru a explica faptele surprinzatoare. Inductia porneste de la o ipoteza ce pare a se impune de la sine, fara a avea de la inceput in vedere o serie de fapte particulare, desi nevoia de fapte se face simtita pentru a sprijini teoria. Abductia isi propune sa ajunga la o teorie. Inductia isi propune sa ajunga la fapte. In cazul abductiei examinarea faptelor sugereaza ipoteza. In cazul inductiei studiul ipotezei sugereaza experimentele care scot la lumina chiar acele fapte pe care le-a sugerat ipoteza." (Ch.Sanders Peirce, apud, Sebeok/sebeok, 1994, p.41).
DEDUCTIE-
"O deductie rezulta intotdeauna in mod necesar si este comparabila cu o actualizare instrumentala ce nu pune probleme.
,
INDUCTIE-
Inductia denumeste testarea unei teoriisi observarea corelatiei dintre teorie si fapte. Ea clasifica lucruri existente si constituie astfel fundamentul proceselor de abstractizare instrumentala.
(
ABDUCTIE-
Abductia este o operatie de rezolvare indrazneata si orientata teleologic care corespunde mecanismului abstractizarii instrumentale accidentale. Se produce astfel trecerea dinspre tipologie cognitiva a actelor de transfer catre o organizare logica a acestora. " *
(G.Kohn - 'Echivalenta ca proiect al traducatorului', 2006)
-----------------------
* "Abductia porneste de la fapte, fara a avea, de la inceput, in vedere o anumita teorie, desi e motivata de sentimentul ca o teorie e necesara pentru a explica faptele surprinzatoare. Inductia porneste de la o ipoteza ce pare a se impune de la sine, fara a avea de la inceput in vedere o serie de fapte particulare, desi nevoia de fapte se face simtita pentru a sprijini teoria. Abductia isi propune sa ajunga la o teorie. Inductia isi propune sa ajunga la fapte. In cazul abductiei examinarea faptelor sugereaza ipoteza. In cazul inductiei studiul ipotezei sugereaza experimentele care scot la lumina chiar acele fapte pe care le-a sugerat ipoteza." (Ch.Sanders Peirce, apud, Sebeok/sebeok, 1994, p.41).
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
vagueness vs. generality (Peirce EP2:342 & EP2:350)
found this excerpt via Gnox on Peirceforums.
" I think it's clear from EP2:350 ff. that vagueness and generality are both varieties of "objective indeterminacy". My question about "subjective generality" referred to this passage (EP:342):
[[[ ...there are two ways of being general. A statue of a soldier on some village monument, in his overcoat and with his musket, is for each of a hundred families the image of its uncle, its sacrifice to the Union.
That statue, then, though it is itself single, represents any one man of whom a certain predicate may be true. It is objectively general. The word "soldier", whether spoken or written, is general in the same way; while the name "George Washington", is not so. But each of these two terms remains one and the same noun, whether it be spoken or written, and whenever and wherever it be spoken or written. This noun is not an existing thing: it is a type, or form, to which objects, both those that are externally existent and those which are imagined, may conform, but which none of them can exactly be.
This is subjective generality.
The pragmaticistic purport is general in both ways. ]]]
The statue is objectively general because the interpreter has the privilege of applying it to the object of his choice (within appropriate limits, of course). "Subjective generality", on the other hand seems to be an alternate way of referring to the type/token relationship -- the difference between forms and existing things -- as it pertains to the sign itself rather than its object.
[[[ EP:350-3
...It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe, -- not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth", -- that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. Let us note this in passing as having a bearing upon the question of pragmaticism. ]]]
It is not clear to me (1( how the universe being perfused with signs explains the phenomenon of generality; or (2( what bearing this has upon the question of pragmaticism. "
sig.:
''''You are really the natural form of emptiness, so there is no need to fear.[Tibetan Bok of the Dead]""
--------------------------------
grey - Myself
black - Gnox
bold - Peirce
[ e m p t y / white space ] - Yourself ( the reader / interpretant )
terms:
*the general* ==
the objectively general, to which the princile of excluded middle does not apply, has its sign chosen by the interpreter
(P's ex. Man is mortal. Which man? Any one -- or all ! -- you, the interpreter, choose).
Also, the general is not particular, but (tends toward) precision. In logical notation, the upside down A.
*the vague* ==
the objectively indeterminate, to which the principle of contradiction does not apply, has its sign in some other sign
(P's ex. I say some man is conceited. Which man? You shall -- perhaps! -- later learn; but the utterer, NOT the interpreter, has the right to choose which man).
Also, the vague is not precise, but (tends towards) particularity. Upside down E.
*the determinate*==
the objectively determinate, to which both the above mentioned principles apply, is singular, has its sign in some particular & precise individual
(GR's ex., my immediate object is of this dynamic object, the man before me; the utterer IS the thing-itself, so to speak).
Upside down E!
-----------------------------
§ Categorially §
E -- vague, indefinite, indeterminate yet particular, 1ns
|>A -- general, in the universal sense, 3ns
E! -- singular, determinate 2ns
§ Vectorially §
*semiosis* ( the object determines the sign for the interpreter )
" I think it's clear from EP2:350 ff. that vagueness and generality are both varieties of "objective indeterminacy". My question about "subjective generality" referred to this passage (EP:342):
[[[ ...there are two ways of being general. A statue of a soldier on some village monument, in his overcoat and with his musket, is for each of a hundred families the image of its uncle, its sacrifice to the Union.
That statue, then, though it is itself single, represents any one man of whom a certain predicate may be true. It is objectively general. The word "soldier", whether spoken or written, is general in the same way; while the name "George Washington", is not so. But each of these two terms remains one and the same noun, whether it be spoken or written, and whenever and wherever it be spoken or written. This noun is not an existing thing: it is a type, or form, to which objects, both those that are externally existent and those which are imagined, may conform, but which none of them can exactly be.
This is subjective generality.
The pragmaticistic purport is general in both ways. ]]]
The statue is objectively general because the interpreter has the privilege of applying it to the object of his choice (within appropriate limits, of course). "Subjective generality", on the other hand seems to be an alternate way of referring to the type/token relationship -- the difference between forms and existing things -- as it pertains to the sign itself rather than its object.
[[[ EP:350-3
...It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe, -- not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth", -- that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. Let us note this in passing as having a bearing upon the question of pragmaticism. ]]]
It is not clear to me (1( how the universe being perfused with signs explains the phenomenon of generality; or (2( what bearing this has upon the question of pragmaticism. "
sig.:
''''You are really the natural form of emptiness, so there is no need to fear.[Tibetan Bok of the Dead]""
--------------------------------
grey - Myself
black - Gnox
bold - Peirce
[ e m p t y / white space ] - Yourself ( the reader / interpretant )
terms:
*the general* ==
the objectively general, to which the princile of excluded middle does not apply, has its sign chosen by the interpreter
(P's ex. Man is mortal. Which man? Any one -- or all ! -- you, the interpreter, choose).
Also, the general is not particular, but (tends toward) precision. In logical notation, the upside down A.
*the vague* ==
the objectively indeterminate, to which the principle of contradiction does not apply, has its sign in some other sign
(P's ex. I say some man is conceited. Which man? You shall -- perhaps! -- later learn; but the utterer, NOT the interpreter, has the right to choose which man).
Also, the vague is not precise, but (tends towards) particularity. Upside down E.
*the determinate*==
the objectively determinate, to which both the above mentioned principles apply, is singular, has its sign in some particular & precise individual
(GR's ex., my immediate object is of this dynamic object, the man before me; the utterer IS the thing-itself, so to speak).
Upside down E!
-----------------------------
§ Categorially §
E -- vague, indefinite, indeterminate yet particular, 1ns
|>A -- general, in the universal sense, 3ns
E! -- singular, determinate 2ns
§ Vectorially §
*semiosis* ( the object determines the sign for the interpreter )
Monday, May 4, 2009
BRASOV TRIP day3
"The blue mountain is the father of the white cloud. The white cloud is the son of the blue mountain. All day long they depend on each other, without being dependent on each other. The white cloud is always the white cloud. The blue mountain is always the blue mountain."
Zen Master Tozan
Saturday, April 25, 2009
Thursday, April 23, 2009
AND...
...sometimes we forget that we were kids...playing around with toys made by grownups. I remember some of the toys I am eager to dig up from my attic and play with them or re-create that environment where I was myself... Here is a list:
Drawing - always doodled - always - always ... on the walls, in my books, in my schoolbooks, on my homework books( who loved homework anyway? ), on myself...
Dearest adults I hereby thank you for the pencil/pen/felt pen ...
...I'll be in my room.
Cheers
PS: of course LEGO will always have a special place in my heart ...
Drawing - always doodled - always - always ... on the walls, in my books, in my schoolbooks, on my homework books( who loved homework anyway? ), on myself...
Dearest adults I hereby thank you for the pencil/pen/felt pen ...
...I'll be in my room.
Cheers
PS: of course LEGO will always have a special place in my heart ...
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Abduction explained --> via Peirce Studies Helsinki
"Let us now consider non-necessary reasoning. This divides itself, according to the different ways in which it may be valid, into three classes: probable deduction; experimental reasoning, which I now call Induction; and processes of thought capable of producing no conclusion more definite than a conjecture, which I now call Abduction.
[---]
Abduction is no more nor less than guessing, a faculty attributed to Yankees. [---] Such validity as this has consists in the generalization that no new truth is ever otherwise reached while some new truths are thus reached. This is a result of Induction; and therefore in a remote way Abduction rests upon diagrammatic reasoning." ('PAP (Prolegomena for an Apology to Pragmatism)' (MS 293), NEM 4:319-320, c. 1906)
more on this subject (and many more) here -> HelsinkiPeirceStudies - very nice site
[---]
Abduction is no more nor less than guessing, a faculty attributed to Yankees. [---] Such validity as this has consists in the generalization that no new truth is ever otherwise reached while some new truths are thus reached. This is a result of Induction; and therefore in a remote way Abduction rests upon diagrammatic reasoning." ('PAP (Prolegomena for an Apology to Pragmatism)' (MS 293), NEM 4:319-320, c. 1906)
"... there are but three elementary kinds of reasoning. The first, which I call abduction (on the theory, the doubtful theory, I confess, that the meaning of the XXVth chapter of the second book of the Prior Analytics has been completely diverted from Aristotle's meaning by a single wrong word having been inserted by Apellicon where the original word was illegible) consists in examining a mass of facts and in allowing these facts to suggest a theory. In this way we gain new ideas; but there is no force in the reasoning.
[---] ... induction is, as Aristotle says, the inference of the truth of the major premiss of a syllogism of which the minor premiss is made to be true and the conclusion is found to be true, while abduction is the inference of the truth of the minor premiss of a syllogism of which the major premiss is selected as known already to be true while the conclusion is found to be true. Abduction furnishes all our ideas concerning real things, beyond what are given in perception, but is mere conjecture, without probative force." (A Letter to Calderoni, CP 8.209, c. 1905)...
[---] ... induction is, as Aristotle says, the inference of the truth of the major premiss of a syllogism of which the minor premiss is made to be true and the conclusion is found to be true, while abduction is the inference of the truth of the minor premiss of a syllogism of which the major premiss is selected as known already to be true while the conclusion is found to be true. Abduction furnishes all our ideas concerning real things, beyond what are given in perception, but is mere conjecture, without probative force." (A Letter to Calderoni, CP 8.209, c. 1905)...
more on this subject (and many more) here -> HelsinkiPeirceStudies - very nice site
Monday, April 20, 2009
SCART - a new place in Town
Scart ( almost spelled 'Scartz' in Scottish ) is a Loc Lejer ( almost translated 'Easy Place' in Yorkshire English ).
Photos by Daniel Dorobantu
Monday, March 2, 2009
A. E.
“The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant. We have created a society that honors the servant and has forgotten the gift.”
Albert Einstein
Albert Einstein
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